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Iwan Rhys Morus, Frankenstein's children:
electricity, exhibition, and experiment in
early-nineteenth-century London, Princeton
University Press, 1998, pp. xiv, 324, illus.,
£32.50 (0-691-05952-7).
The title and subtitle of Iwan Rhys
Morus' book indicate a divided loyalty. In
making good the subtitle, he offers solid
accounts of institutions and activities
neglected by the few remaining historians of
science who confine their business to an
internalist chronicle of advances in high
theory and fundamental experiment.
Faithful to the usual canons of evidence
and argumentation, Morus discusses the
exploitation of electricity for amusement,
the short life of the London Electrical
Society, and the equivocal status of William
Sturgeon, who tried to climb the slippery
ladder from a gallery of science to the
Royal Society and had the temerity to take
on Faraday. Men who learned about
electrical experiments in the popular
galleries might go on to contribute to
Sturgeon's respectable Annals ofelectricity
or to participate in the first commercial
applications of electricity. Morus' reviews of
the early histories of electroplating and
telegraphy are informed and informative.
His briefer account of electrotherapy will be
of particular interest to readers of this
journal.
What has this to do with the children of
Frankenstein advertised in the title? Apart
from describing grotesque effects of galvanic
batteries on freshly executed criminals,
Morus realizes the monstrous connotation
of his title by stomping on his material now
and again to make it fit a currently popular
historiographical programme. This
programme forces the laudable and
legitimate project of relating the practice
and application of science to wider aspects
of society far beyond the evidence. If this
programme is a Frankenstein, then Morus'
book is one of its children. Let us have
some examples.
"Drawing on the resources of
contemporary science, [Mary] Shelley could
convincingly portray [in Frankenstein] the
problematics of the laboratory
experimenter's attempt to carve space for
himself in early nineteenth-century culture."
Now, Shelley's story is set in the eighteenth
century; the experiment takes place in an
attic bedroom; the creator, the student
Frankenstein, worked alone and secretly;
the inspiration for his creation came from
crazy old magicians, like Cornelius Agrippa,
and the required technical information from
the professors in a small German university.
Morus' story takes place mainly in and
after the 1830s; his experimenters work and
demonstrate in rooms maintained for the
purpose; they are not juvenile students of
occult arts but grown men trying to make a
living from their science; they are not driven
by shame to keep their work secret; they
have no time for Agrippa; they "carve
spaces for [themselves]" in well-lighted,
hard-headed England, not in dark, gothic
Germany. Shelley set out to write a ghost
story, not to portray the lot of Morus'
experimenters.
"Maxwell in particular presented his
electromagnetic theories as being the
articulation in mathematical language of
Faraday's experimental results. The
integrity of the new physics thus [!]
depended on the preservation and defense
of Michael Faraday's reputation." Some
think that the integrity of nineteenth-
century electromagnetism, which was not
a British monopoly, depended on the fact
that laws like Faraday's adequately
represented the phenomena. But no. "The
outcome of an experiment depends as
much on the process of negotiation
among participants as it does on the
successful manipulation of apparatus." To
instantiate this fundamental law of the
new historiography of science, Morus
"attempt[s] a deconstruction by focusing
on the ways in which Faraday constructed
spaces for himself, so that he could
fashion a career through experiment." Fair
enough. But how could Morus'
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deconstruction demonstrate his
fundamental law or affect
Maxwell's account of electromagnetic
induction?
These are small potatoes, however,
when you consider that "electrical
experiments could mold politics as much
as politics did electricity." Do not think
that the meaning of this equality is that
neither affected the other. No sirree.
"Replacing the Newtonian philosophy with
the electrical theory of the universe meant
replacing the whole social, political, and
religious order that underpinned early-
nineteenth-century life."
A final grotesque. "By the 1830s the
dominant ethos had shifted away from
Enlightenment ideals [progress via
association and co-operation]. Scientific
discovery and progress were now held to
emerge from the workings of isolated
genius rather than from dubious cabals
such as the Lunar Society with which
Priestley had been associated." Let us
leave aside whether the Royal Society, the
Academie des sciences in Paris, the
universities of Europe; and the republic of
letters in the later eighteenth century were
or are aptly characterized as dubious
cabals. Was England in the 1830s
distinguished for practising the cult of the
isolated scientific genius? No. Then and
there the greatest of all clubs for scientific
men, the British Association for the
Advancement of Science, was founded and
waxed exceedingly. This peculiar
clubbiness was so conspicuous that
Dickens made it a subject of satire.
Morus' extravagances deserve a place in
the Proceedings of the Mudfog
Association for the Advancement of
Everything and the Transactions of the
Pickwick Club, as an addendum to its
president's theory of tittlebats.
J L Heilbron,
Worcester College,
Oxford
Jennifer Ford, Coleridge on dreaming:
romanticism, dreams, and the medical
imagination, Cambridge Studies in
Romanticism 26, Cambridge University
Press, 1998, pp. xii, 256, £37.50, $59.95
(0-521-58316-0).
Since the Greeks the category imagination
has been configured to belong to poets and
gods-far from therapy-seeking doctors,
although shamans among doctors
interpreted the imagination's dreams; this
proprietary status despite the more recent
medicalization of the imagination (the article
is crucial) as an anatomical region of the
corporafabrica in the Renaissance and
Enlightenment. By the time of the French
Revolution the imagination had been
medicalized (i.e., mechanized, anatomized,
physiologized, neuralized) to such degree
that it was unthinkable to visualize its
operations other than mechanically (these
were visual conceptions or pictures in
words) or apart from material foundations.
Enter Charcot, Freud, and Jung and still
another view predominates. Yet set the dials
earlier or later and ask, who owned the
discourses of imagination? The question is
more difficult to answer. After c. 1500 no
one group: not artists, not poets, not
doctors. Proof of ownership and its
consequences constitutes the genuine
methodology of Ford's splendid book,
although Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(1772-1834), the polymathic Romantic
thinker and theorist, is her alleged
protagonist. Coleridge proves an excellent
test-case considering that his notebooks
have been neglected.
But Coleridge's organic and vitalist
philosophy demonstrates that not even he
could dislodge this European theory of
imagination from its Enlightenment
material-mechanic moorings. Moving
forward (Coleridge died in 1834),
philosophers regularly consulted his
aesthetics, especially his dream theory
placing dreams on a still more physiological
footing than his materialist predecessors.
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